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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 14028

- vs MIDWEST REALTY AND FINANCE,
INC., a Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
oooOooo

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
oooOooo
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff brought this action seeking payment from
the Defendant on a Promissory Note and an accounts receivable
extension of credit.

Plaintiff asserts liability on the part

of the Defendant by reason of certain guarantys. (Exhibit P-3
and P-ll.) Plaintiff alleges that there are separate continuing guarantys from Defendant to Plaintiff covering the
Promissory Note and accounts receivable due Plaintiff from Lee
Chair Corporation.

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to

pay the amount due on Plaintiff's demand after Lee Chair defaulted on its debts. Defendant asserts that there was only
one continuing guaranty and that pursuant to the terms thereof,
it was revoked by a letter from Defendant to Plaintiff dated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

July 6, 1971, and that Defendant was not liable to Plaintiff
for the debts incurred after that date. (Exhibit P-6.)
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Judge J. E.
Banks, presiding without jury, ruled in favor of the Plaintiff,
requiring Defendant to pay to Plaintiff $59,000.00 principal on
the Promissory Note dated February 4, 1972; $8,874.26 principal
on the accounts receivable credit line; $5,000.00 attorney's fees;
$236.48 costs of court; interest on the Promissory Note of February
4, 1972, in the sum of $17,116.02; and interest on the accounts
receivable credit line in the sum of $5,932.06, for a total sum
of $96,158.82, plus 8% interest per annum from January 22, 1975,
until paid.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

'

Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and dismissal
of the action in its entirety or in the alternative, for reversal
of the judgment with regard to all damages in excess of the

J
\

$59,000.00 principal on the promissory note dated February 4,
1972.

j
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 4, 1970, Midwest Realty and Finance, Inc.

j

(hereafter "Defendant") executed and delivered to Wells Fargo

j

Bank (hereafter "Plaintiff" or "Bank") a Continuing Guaranty

*

prepared by Plaintiff to pay Plaintiff upon demand all indebted-

1

ness of Lees Chair Corporation (hereafter "Lee") and Richard
Maggs, its President, up to $60,000.00.

(Exhibit P-3.)
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This

J

guaranty authorized the bank to "renew, extend or accelerate
the terms of the indebtedness. . .without notice or demand. . ."
to the guarantor and allowed the Bank to "permit the indebtedness to exceed guarantor's liability."

The guaranty also speci-

fically provided that:
"This guaranty shall not apply to any indebtedness created after actual receipt by Bank of
written notice of its revocation as to future
transactions."
On November 5 f 1970, Plaintiff advanced to Lee the sum
of $60,000.00.

In December, 1970, it became evident that Lee

needed more than $60,000.00 in credit. On December 17, 1970,
Defendant executed and delivered to Plaintiff a continuing
guaranty form prepared by Plaintiff in the amount of $130,000.00.
(Exhibit P-11.)
of funds to Lee.

Plaintiff thereafter made additional advances
The terms of this guaranty were identical

to the form executed and delivered on November 4, 1970.
The $60,000.00 debt was renewed on February 11, 1971.
On July 6, 1971, a letter was mailed by Defendant to
Plaintiff which stated in pertinent part that:
"During the recent meeting of the Board of Directors of Midwest Realty and Finance, we reviewed
our financial commitments. It was the decision
of the Board that we will withdraw the "Continuing Guaranty" of Midwest Realty & Finance, Inc.
for and in behalf of L.E.E. Chair Corporation.
This guaranty is dated December 17, 1970, and
is in the amount of $130,000.00."
"It is our desire that the guaranty be immediately reduced to the amount of the outstanding
obligations covered by the L.E.E. Chair note. We
believe this to be about $85,000.00."
M

We would appreciate your earliest reply, indicating any further requirements for finalizing this
cancellation." (Exhibit P-6.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Thereafter Wells Fargo Bank again renewed the $60,000.00
debt on August 4, 1971, and September 22, 1971, (T.R. 34) On
February 4, 1972, a new Promissory Note in the amount of
$59^000.00 was executed by the president of Lee Chair, Richard
Maggs, in favor of Plaintiff, evidenced by a Promissory Note
bearing that date (Exhibit P-2).
Contemporaneous with the Defendant's execution of the
December 17, 1970 Guaranty, Lee executed a Continuing Security
Agreement with the Plaintiff (Exhibit P-9) . It provided, inter
alia, that:
"Said security interest secures payment and performance of: all present and future indebtedness
of Debtor to Bank; all obligations of Debtor and
rights of Bank under this agreement; and all present and future obligations of Debtor to Bank of
other kinds." (Paragraph 2.)
* * * * * * * * *

"In accordance with customary accounting practice, Bank shall credit to such Promissory Notes
or enter in Debtor's Loan Account all payments
made by the Debtor on account of indebtedness
evidenced by such Promissory Notes on Loan
Account, all proceeds of collateral which are
finally paid to Bank at its own office in cash
or solvent credits, and other appropriate debts
and credits." (Paragraph 4.)
* * * * * * * * *

"While Debtor is not in default, Bank will, except to the amount of contingent liabilities
secured hereby, either release or apply to a
debt secured hereby, at Bank's option, all security in the form of cash or irrevocable bank
credit. Any sums withheld to secure contingent
liabilities may be deposited at Bank's option in
a non-interest bearing account over which Debtor
will have no control." (Paragraph 5.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On July 6, 1971, the total credit extended from Plaintiff to Lee amounted to $91,672.97, plus interest.

Plaintiff

continued after July 6, 1971, to rewrite and extend credit to
Lee in the amount of $280,931.90, while receiving monies in payment from Lee of approximately $272,057.64, leaving a balance
owing on August 16, 1973, of $8,874.26.

(Exhibit P-10.)

Plaintiff, through Walt Winrow, responded to Defendant's
letter of July 6, 1971, by contacting John Wells, a director of
Defendant, by telephone.
of the Defendant.

(T.R. 13)

Wells was not an officer

(T.R. 7) Winrow and Wells discussed the out-

standing credit situations with regard to Midwest, Lee and
Wells Fargo.

From July 7, 1971 to September 21, 1972, no further

action was taken with regard to the Continuing Guaranty.

On

September 21, 1972, Plaintiff wrote an information letter to Defendant, stating that Plaintiff had continued to extend credit
and advances to Lee.

Plaintiff stated in the letter that it

considered the guaranty to still be in force with regard to a
$59,000.00 Promissory Note and the amounts outstanding on
accounts receivable.

Plaintiff made demand on Defendant to pay

some $91,500.00 on February 8, 1973,, (Exhibit P-14) , and Plaintiff's attorney reiterated said demand on July 18, 1973, to
which demands Defendant did not respond.
Plaintiff then commenced this action on August 13, 1973.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS CASE IS ONE IN EQUITY AND THIS COURT MAY REVIEW
BOTH ISSUES OF LAW AND FACT.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Plaintiff in this action seeks payment from the
Defendant based upon certain "Continuing GuarantysM of a debt
"incurred by Lee Chair*

At issue is whether the first Continu-

ing Guaranty was superseded by the second one.

This issue is

primarily concerned with the terms of the agreements and the conduct of the parties in relation thereto.

The Defendant asserts

that the two are at odds with one another.
Secondly, at issue is whether the Defendant cancelled
the Continuing Guaranty.
not.

The Plaintiff maintains that it did

The Defendant contends that it did.
Closely related to this is the issue of the Plaintiff's

handling and allocation of funds on the Lee account after notice
of cancellation.

The Defendant maintains that the Plaintiff

failed to act in good faith pursuant to the agreements of the
parties and Lee.
As such, this case deals in equity.

This Court may

therefore review both issues of law and fact.
As set forth in McCullough v. Wasserback, 30 Utah 2d
398, 518 P. 2d 691 (1974), this Court has consistently held
that:
In considering whether that standard of
proof has been met we keep in mind that
this is a case in equity in which this
court may review the facts, yet do not
lose sight of the prerogatives indulged
the trial court; that even in equity cases
his findings and judgment will not be disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates against them and a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought. But if
these are seen to exist, this court may
make its own findings and judgment to
supersede those of the trial court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is the Court's prerogative and duty under the Constitution to review the evidence in equity cases and to modify or
make new findings if the record compels it. First Security Bank
of Utah v. Demiris, 10 Utah 2d 405, 354 P. 2d 97 (1960).
ARGUMENT
POINT II
THE CONTINUING GUARANTY OF DECEMBER 17, 1970, SUPERSEDED THE CONTINUING GUARANTY OF NOVEMBER 4, 1970.
The Defendant executed separate, identical forms prepared by Plaintiff and bearing the heading "Continuing Guaranty,"
to secure the indebtedness of Lee Chair Corporation.

The first

was executed November 4, 1970, (Exhibit P-3), and the second was
executed December 17, 1970 (Exhibit P-11).

The first document

was to guaranty indebtedness up to $60,000.00, which sums Plaintiff subsequently advanced to Lee.

It later became evident that

Lee required additional credit in excess of $60,000.00. The
second Guaranty form (Exhibit P-11) was executed by the Defendant
to secure liabilities up to $130,000.00. Contemporaneously, Lee
executed the Continuing Security Agreement (Exhibit P-9).

Plain-

tiff's total advancements to Lee never exceeded $95,000.00.
The Continuing Guaranty Agreements state, inter alia,
that:
"(1) For valuable consideration, the undersigned (hereinafter called Guarantors) jointly
and severally unconditionally guarantee and
promise to pay to WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a
California Corporation (hereinafter called
Bank), or order, on demand in lawful money of
the United States, any and all indebtedness
of Lee Chair Corporation and Richard Maggs
(hereinafter called Borrowers) to Bank."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The document dated November 4, 1970, states:
"(2) The liability of Guarantors shall not
exceed at any one time the sum of Sixty Thousand Dollars for principal, together with all
interest on such part of the indebtedness as
does not exceed aforesaid principal."
The document dated December 17, 1970, states as above
except the principal sum is "One Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars"
(2) goes on to state:
"• . . .Notwithstanding the foregoing, Bank may
permit the indebtedness of Borrowers to exceed
Guarantors' liability. This is a continuing guaranty relating to any indebtedness, including
that arising under successive transactions which
shall either continue the indebtedness or from
time to time renew it after it has been satisfied.
This Guaranty shall not apply to any indebtedness
created after actual receipt by Bank of written
notice of its revocation as to future transactions.
Any payment by Guarantors shall not reduce their
maximum obligation hereunder, unless written notice
to that effect be actually received by Bank at or
prior to the time of such payment. The obligations
of Guarantors hereunder shall be in addition to
any obligations of Guarantors, or either of them,
under any other guarantys of the indebtedness of
Borrowers or any other persons heretofore given or
hereafter to be given to Bank unless said other
guarantys are expressly modified or revoked in
writing; and this Guaranty shall not, unless expressly herein provided, affect or invalidate any
such other guarantys. The liability of any
Guarantor to Bank shall at all times be deemed to
be the aggregate liability of said Guarantor under
the terms of this Guaranty, and of any other
guarantys heretofore or hereafter given by
said Guarantor to Bank and not expressly revoked, modified or invalidated." (emphasis
added)
* * * * * * * * *

"(4) Guarantors authorize Bank, without notice
or demand and without affecting their liability
hereunder, from time to time to (a) renew,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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extendf accelerate or otherwise change the time
for payment of, or otherwise change the terms of
the indebtedness or any part thereof, including
increase or decrease of the rate of interest
thereon; (b) take and hold security for the payment of this Guaranty or the indebtedness guaranteedf and exchange, enforce, waive and release
any such security; (c) apply such security and
direct the order or manner of sale thereof as
Bank in its discretion may determine; and (d) release or substitute any one or more of the endorsers or guarantors. Bank may without notice assign
this Guaranty in whole or in part, (emphasis added)
"(5) Guarantors waive any right to require Bank
to (a) proceed against Borrowers; (b) proceed
against or exhaust any security held from borrowers;
or (c) pursue any other remedy in Bank's power whatsoever. Guarantors waive any defense arising by
reason of any disability or other defense of
Borrowers or by reason of the cessation from any
cause whatsoever of the liability of Borrowers.
Until all indebtedness of Borrowers to Bank shall
have been paid in full, even though such indebtedness is in excess of Guarantors' liability hereunder,
Guarantors shall have no right of subrogation, and
waive any right to enforce any remedy which Bank
now has or may hereafter have against Borrowers,
and waive any benefit of, and any right to participate in any security now or hereafter held by Bank.
Guarantors waive all presentments, demands for
performance, notice of non-performance, protests,
notices of protest, notices of dishonor, and notices
of acceptance of this Guaranty and of the existence,
creation, or incurring of new or additional indebtedness. "
Certain provisions of the agreements as quoted above,
when considered in context of the course of conduct of the
parties, clearly indicate that they intended the second Guaranty
to supersede the first.
Paragraph (2) of the Continuing Guaranty form states:
"The obligations of Guarantors hereunder shall be
in addition to any obligations of Guarantors, or
either of them, under any other guaranties of the
indebtedness of Borrowers or any other persons

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 9 -

heretofore given or hereafter to be given to Bank
unless said other guaranties are expressly modified or revoked in writing; and this Guaranty shall
not, unless expressly herein provided, affect or
invalidate any such other guaranties;. . . "
However, the law is clear that the course of conduct
of the parties to a written agreement can modify an express term
of that agreement.

In the case of Tucker Sales Corporation v.

Potter, 104 Utah 1, 137 P.2d 270, 1943, the Court stated as
follows with regard to the construction of a contract:
"On the other hand, the court's construction is
that given the contract by the parties themselves.
From October 1, 1938, when the contract was entered into, until August 1941, almost three years,
the partnership furnished plaintiff with duplicate
slips and paid without question plaintiff's commission on all coal sold. Appellants first raised
this question on October 6, 1941. Nothing could
show the intention of the parties more clearly
than the interpretation they themselves place upon
a contract. It is well settled in this state that
where the parties to a contract, with full knowledge of the terms thereof, by their actions before
any controversy has arisen, place upon it a construction which is not contrary to the usual
meaning of the language used the courts will follow
that construction.
(See also Fowers v. Lawson, 56 Utah 420, 191 P. 227; Roberts
v. Tuttle, 36 Utah 614, 105 P. 916; Titton v. Sterling Coal &
Coke Co., 28 Utah 173, 77P. 758, 107 Am. St. Rep. 689; Snyder
v. Fidelity Savings Association, 23 Utah 291, 64 P. 870; Woodward
v. Edmonds, 20 Utah 118,57 P. 848; Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11
Utah 331, 40 P. 206.)
In the case of Hodges Insurance Co., v. Swan Creek
Canal Co., 111 Utah 405, 181 P.2d 217, 1947, the court stated:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"A practical construction of the terms of a contract by the parties thereto implies a mutual and
identical interpretation."
The Court goes on to quote 17 C.J.S., "Contracts,"
Section 325, Subdivision 5, Page 765, as follows:
"To warrant the court in according great weight /
or adopting, a practical construction by the
parties, it is necessary and sufficient that each
party shall have placed the same construction on
the contract. While the construction placed by
one party on his own language in a contract is the
highest evidence of his own intention, the meaning
of the contract cannot be established by the construction placed on it by one of the parties, unless such interpretation has been made to and
relied on by the other party, or has been known to and
acquiesced in by the other party,. . . . "
In this case, both the parties put the same construction on the terms of the guaranty dated December 17, 1970, i.e.
that guaranty superseded the guaranty of November 4, 1970.
In the case of Builough v. Sims, 16 U.2d 304, 400 P.2d
20, 1965, quoting the California Supreme Court, this Court said:
"Appellants correctly claim that this doctrine of
practical construction can only be applied when
the contract is ambiguous, and cannot be used when
the contract is unambiguous. That is undoubtedly
a correct general statement of the law. (Citations
omitted). But the question involved in such cases
is ambiguous to whom? Words frequently mean different things to different people. Here the contracting parties demonstrated by their actions
that they knew what the words meant and were intended to mean. Thus, even if it be assumed that
the words standing alone might mean one thing to
the members of this court, where the parties have
demonstrated by their actions and performance
that to them the contract meant something quite
different, the meaning and intent of the parties
should be enforced. In such a situation the
parties by their actions have created the
"ambiguity" required to bring the rule into operation. If this were not the rule the courts would
be enforcing one contract when both parties have
demonstrated that they meant and intended the contract to be quite different."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Subsequently restated in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28
U.2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 1972.)
In the present action, there are ambiguities in the
Guaranty Agreement when considered in light of the subsequent
conduct of the parties. The law is that ambiguities be resolved
against the maker of the instrument, or in cases in which the
parties have put an interpretation on the ambiguity the court
should apply the construction applied by the parties themselves.
The parties both treated the debt and guaranty as if there was
only one guaranty.

Only upon commencement of this action has

Plaintiff begun to refer to two guaranties.
At the trial, G. R. Harmon, President of Defendant,
testified that the guaranty of December 17, 1970, was intended
to replace or supersede the first guaranty, and that Defendant
never intended to be obligated for debts of Lee in excess of
$130,000.00 (T.R. 64). The Security Agreement executed by Plaintiff and Lee (Exhibit P-9) and all of the letters between the
parties, which are Exhibits P-6, P-8, P-13, and P-14, and the
minutes of Defendant, (Exhibit P-l) , all show that both parties
refer only to one continuing guaranty and rely only on one
continuing guaranty between them.
The continuing Security Agreement, executed between
Plaintiff and Lee contemporaneous with the December 17, 1970,
guaranty, on December 18, 1970, secures (Paragraph 2) "All present and future indebtedness of Debtor (Lee) to Bank; all obligations of Debtor and rights of bank of other kinds." The

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Security Agreement terminates (Paragraph 3) only "upon payment
of all indebtedness and performance of all obligations existing
when Bank receives written notice of withdrawal of this
Agreement by Debtor."

The Security Agreement treats all ob-

ligations of Lee (guaranteed by Defendant) as one liability, including the $60,000.00 originally advanced and later advancements.
Defendant's letter of July 6, 1971, to Plaintiff states:
"During the recent meeting of the Board of Directors of Midwest Realty and Finance, we reviewed
our financial commitments. It was the decision
of the Board that we will withdraw the "Continuing Guaranty" of Midwest Realty and Finance,
Inc. for an in behalf of L.E.E. Chair Corporation.
This guaranty is dated December 17, 1970, and is
in the amount of $130,000.00.
"It is our desire that the guaranty be immediately
reduced to the amount of the outstanding obligations covered by the L.E.E. Chair Note. We believe
this to be about $85,000.00.
"We would appreciate your earliest reply, indicating any further requirements for finalizing
this cancellation."
This letter states unequivocably that the company will
withdraw the continuing guaranty of Defendant for Lee, and then
refers to that guaranty as dated December 17, 1970, and as being
in the amount of $130,000.00. The letter refers to the guaranty
in the singular and speaks of a single sum liability of
$85,000.00.

It is obvious that Defendant was referring to one

guaranty as inclusive of the total debt.

Indeed, this is the only

reasonable interpretation that can be placed upon this language
when one considers the knowledge of the Plaintiff as to the total
indebtedness outstanding at the time.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiff's letter of September 21, 1972, to Defendant
states that it is Plaintiff's position that Defendant's guaranty
was still in effect.

It speaks of one guaranty as follows:

"In regard to your guarantee, I am enclosing a
copy for your records in the event you might not
have one. Our position, simply stated, is that *
we have felt and continue to feel that you guaranteed
these loans. As to your letter of July 6, 1971,
we have discussed this with Mr. Winrow and he
stated that according to his conversation with
Mr. Wells, the intent of the letter was to 'cap'
the borrowing which was done. We, therefore,
contend that you in fact do guaranty Lee Chair's
indebtedness to Wells Fargo Bank." (emphasis
added)
Plaintiff's letter of February 8, 1973 to Defendant
is a demand letter for payment of Lee's indebtedness. (Exhibit
P-14.) That letter states, inter alia, that:
"At the present time, the following is owed by
Lee Chair:
Promissory Note
Interest paid to February 25, 1972

$59,000.00

Accounts Receivable Financing
Interest paid to March 25, 1972

$32,500.00

Obviously, further forebearance on the part of the
bank is unfeasible. Therefore, we are making formal request for payment of these obligations
under the terms of the Continuing Guaranty you executed on December 17, 1970." (emphasis added)
This letter clearly evidences that up until the institution of this action, the Plaintiff also treated the indebtedness
of Lee as being covered by one guaranty, the one of December 17,
1970.

(Exhibit P-ll.)

Only upon institution of this action did

the Plaintiff apparently find it advantageous to treat the Lee
indebtedness separately.
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In addition to these letters, the Defendant's minutes
of June 22, 1972, and of August 14, 1973 refer to only one
guaranty of the debts of Lee from Defendant to Plaintiff.
(Exhibit P-l.)
It should also be noted that the Plaintiff's accounts
card, (Exhibit P-10), from February, 1971, until July, 1971,
illustrate that the accounts were guaranteed by a guaranty from
Defendant dated December 17, 1970. After July, 1971, and receipt of Defendant's letter of cancellation (Exhibit P-6)
Plaintiff no longer showed any guaranty on the accounts until
May of 1972, when Plaintiff began to show a guaranty from
R. Maggs of Lee Chair Company on its accounts.
Plaintiff never in all its course of dealing with Lee
and Defendant allowed the credit extended to Lee to exceed the
$130,000.00 limits of the December 17, 1970 guaranty.

In fact,

it never exceeded $95,000.00 (T.R. 66). The course of conduct
of Plaintiff as well as Defendant shows that both parties intended that the guaranty of December 17, 1970, supersede the
guaranty of November 4, 1970, and both parties acted in reliance upon that fact up until the time that this action was
commenced.
POINT III
THE CONTINUING GUARANTY FROM DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF
WAS REVOKED AS TO ALL FUTURE TRANSACTIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF
CREDIT BY THE LETTER FROM DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF DATED JULY 6,
1971.
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The continuing guaranty form used by Plaintiff, which
was executed by Defendant in the November 4, 1970, transaction
and the December 17, 1970, transaction, states in Paragragh (2)
that:
"This guaranty shall not apply to any indebtedness created after the actual receipt by Bank
of written notice of its revocation as to future
transactions."
The letter of July 6, 1971 (Exhibit P-6) from Defendant
to Plaintiff states that:
"During the recent meeting of the Board of Directors of Midwest Realty & Finance, we reviewed
our financial commitments. It was the decision
of the Board that we will withdraw the 'Continuing Guaranty1 of Midwest Realty & Finance,
Inc. for and in behalf of Lee Chair Corporation.
This guaranty is dated December 17, 1970, and
is in the amount of $130,000.00.
"It is our desire that the guaranty be immediately reduced to the amount of the outstanding
obligations covered by the Lee Chair note. We
believe this to be about $85,000.00.
"We would appreciate your earliest reply indicating any further requirement for finalizing
this cancellation. (Emphasis added)
As of the date of this letter, Defendant was obligated
to Plaintiff for the outstanding balance of credit extended to
Lee pursuant to Defendant's continuing guaranty to Plaintiff.
Defendant clearly stated that it was withdrawing and cancelling
the continuing guaranty with regard to any transactions after
the date of the letter.

Defendant's cancellation was pursuant

to and in accordance with the terms of the continuing guaranty
executed by the parties.
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Plaintiff made no official response to the letter of
cancellation until September 21, 1972 when Plaintiff wrote an
information letter to Defendant (Exhibit P-8) stating Plaintiff's
position with regard to the guaranty as follows:
"Lee Chair Corporation is presently indebted to *
Wells Fargo Bank in the amount of $77,461.86.
This is broken down as follows: $59,000.00 unsecured note and $18,461.86 in the form of accounts receivable financing. The accounts receivable line is still in effect so that balance
may fluctuate. However, the maximum has been
capped at $32,500.00. We have continued to
allow this borrowing because if we cease to allow
it, it would result in the closing of the business, thereby eliminating any possibility of
their repaying the other note. As you can see,
the accounts receivable line is being used properly by Mr. Maggs. . . . "
"Our position, simply stated is that we have
felt and continue to feel that you guaranty
these loans. As to your letter of July 6,
1971, we have discussed this with Mr. Winrow
and he stated that according to his conversation with Mr. Wells, the intent of the letter
was to cap the borrowing which was done. We,
therefore, contend that you in fact do guaranty
Lee Chair's indebtedness to Wells Fargo Bank."
In this letter and in the letter of February 8, 1973,
Plaintiff attempts to explain why it continued to extend credit
to Lee even though they had notice since July 6, 1971, of Defendant's cancellation.

In the letter of February 8, 1973, Plain-

tiff stated:
"This company is in serious difficulty at the
present time. We have allowed the Accounts Receivable line to remain open (maximum advance
$32,500.00) in order to allow the company's
continued operation and to assist Mr. Maggs in
his attempts to find a solution to the firm's
financial difficulties."
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The explanations advanced to Defendant in these two
letters indicate no reliance on the guaranty in extending this
additional credit, and no prior notice to Defendant, but rather
a business decision on the part of Plaintiff, for which Defendant
should not be held responsible.

This kind of business decision

made on the part of Wells Fargo Bank should have no effect on
the Continuing Guaranty entered into between Defendant and
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff continued to extend credit to Defendant

without any written authorization of any kind.

Further extension

of credit after the cancellation letter of July 6, 1971 is beyond the obligation incurred by Defendant in executing the
Continuing Guaranty of December 17, 1970 as set forth by the
specific language of the Agreement, to-wit:
"This guaranty shall not apply to any indebtedness created after actual receipt by Bank of
written notice of its revocation as to future
transactions" (Paragraph 2)
The Bank acknowledges receipt of Defendant's letter of
July 6, 1971, which states:
" . . . .we will withdraw the 'Continuing
Guaranty' of Midwest Realty & Finance, Inc.
for and in behalf of Lee Chair Corporation."
Plaintiff had notice of Defendant's cancellation pursuant to the terms of the guaranty, yet they continued to extend credit to Lee, Defendant is not liable for any such extension of credit after July 6, 1971.
G. R. Harmon was the only party with authority to cancel or modify the cancellation pursuant to action of the Board
of Directors of Defendant.

The letter of cancellation was
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signed by Mr. Harmon (Exhibit P-6) , and all agreements were signed
by Mr. Harmon (Exhibits P-3 and P-ll).

At the trial, Plaintiff

introduced evidence that a director of the Defendant, John Wells,
had authorized "capping the accounts receivable line at
$35,000.00."

That evidence, in the form of notes scribbled on a

letter pursuant to a telephone conversation, was admitted as an
exception to the heresy rule (T.R. 40). Defendant contends that
the evidence was wrongfully admitted because they were not identified by the person who ostensibly took the notes, they were
not taken in the regular course of business of the bank, and the
method and circumstances of their preparation was not such as to
indicate their trustworthiness.

In addition there was insuffi-

cient foundation as to witnesses ability to recognize the writing.
(T.R. 38-40)
Finally, Wells, as a director of Defendant, had no authority
to authorize "capping" of any credit extensions. Mr. Wells also
testified that he did not authorize any such action (T.R. 17, 19).
At 34 A.L.R. 2d 290, Authority Of Officers or Agent to Bind Corporation as Guarantor or Surety, states:
"But individual directors have no authority
even in connection with a contract authorized
by vote of the board, to add a guaranty to it
in order to facilitate its performance."
19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, Section 1120, states:
"As a consequence, a single director of a
corporation as such has no power to act in a
representative capacity for the corporation. . M
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Such was the case with regard to the telephone conversation between Plaintiff's officer and John Wells.

Plaintiff

cannot rely on that conversation as any authority for its continued extension of credit to Lee being guaranteed by Defendant.
This is especially true when Plaintiff had always dealt only
with Harmon.

Plaintiff knew Harmon was president and had auth-

ority to act for the Defendant.
The conversation was the only evidence propounded by
the Plaintiff to support its position that it was authorized by
the Defendant to "cap" the guaranty rather than "cancell" the
guaranty as called for in the Defendant's letter to the Plaintiff (Exhibit P-6).

Even if one assumes that Mr. Wells did in-

dicate the intent was to "cap" the account, he clearly had no
authority to act for the Defendant corporation and could not
alter the terms of the letter.
Thus, the lower Court's conclusions and findings in
this regard constituted prejudicial error requiring reversal
of its decision herein.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY CREDIT EXTENDED TO
LEE BY PLAINTIFF AFTER JULY 6, 1971.
After July 6, 1971f the Plaintiff extended funds to
Lee Chair in the total amount of $280.931.90, and received from
Lee monies in payment of those funds advanced of approximately
$272,057.64, leaving a balance owing from Lee to Plaintiff on
August 16, 1973, of $67,874.26 (Exhibits P-10 and P-16).
tiff claims that Defendant is liable for said debt.
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Plain-

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty states:
". . .the offer to guaranty future obligations
may be revoked by the guarantor, at least in the
absence of a contrary provision in the guaranty
instrument, with the result that the guarantor
will not be liable to the creditor on the latterfs
extension of credit to the debtor subsequent to
the receipt of notice of revocation."
It should further be noted that:
"Where a guaranty is continuing in character. . .,
it may be withdrawn on notice and the guarantor
will not be affected by any transaction between
the principal obligor and the guaranty subsequent
to the notice." (Duration of a Continuing
Guaranty, 81 A.L.R. 795.)
"A guaranty does not cover renewals, after revocation of claims within coverage at the time
of recovation." (Guaranty as Covering Renewals,
After Revocation of Claims Within Coverage at
Time of Revocation, 100 A.L.R. 1236.)
The terms of the Continuing Guaranty itself (Exhibit
P-ll) specifically provides that:
"This Guaranty shall not apply to any indebtedness created after actual receipt by Bank by
written notice of its revocation as to future
transactions." (Paragraph 2)
It is clear that sums substantially in excess of the
amount outstanding on the date of cancellation were received
and credited to Lee's account subsequent to that cancellation.
It is also clear that the Plaintiff chose to advance additional
funds to Lee in "future transactions".
There was no agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant to "cap" the accounts receivable financing between Lee
and Plaintiff.

Indeed no officer of Defendant corporation ever

spoke with any employee or officer of Plaintiff corporation
about capping of any financing between Lee and Plaintiff (T.R.

17, 18, 19).
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Plaintiff was on notice that Defendant would not
guaranty any future transactions between Lee and Plaintiff as
of July 6, 1971.

In spite of this, Plaintiff continued to ad-

vance credit to Lee and receive payments from Lee without
applying those payments to the total outstanding debt of Lee
guaranteed by the Defendant, including the advance of $60,000,00.
By so doing, Plaintiff failed to act in good faith with regard
to the guarantor of the credit advanced to Lee between November 4,
1970 and July 6, 1971.
In the case of Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., 103
Utah 441, 135 P.2d 906, 1943, the Court, in stating the rules of
construction for letters of credit and guarantys, stated:
"Giving rules for construction of letters of
credit or guaranty, the court says in MarshallWells Co. v. Tenncy, or guaranty are contracts
of an extensive use in the commercial world,
and upon the faith of which large credits and
advances are made. A letter of credit should
not receive a strict and technical interpretation, but a fair and reasonable one, according
to the true import of its terms, and what may
be fairly presumed to have been the intention
and understanding of the parties , with a view to
the furtherance of its spirit, and in order to
attain the object designed. . . . "
"In Lamborn v. National Park Bank, 212 App. Div.
25, 208 N.Y.S. 428,436, the Court construed together several different letters between the
parties, and made a letter of credit out of them.
Giving the rules of construction for contracts,
as they are applied to letters of credit, the
Court said: 'answer to the appellant's contention that, by taking the three letters. . . .
together, the letter of credit was accepted
by Lamborn & Co.. . .is found in the rule that
the bank's writings must be taken most strongly
against it, and must be construed so as to be
reasonable and consistent, and their intent
deemed to have been an honorable and honest one.'
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(See also Doelger v. Battery Park Nat. Bank, 201 App. Div.
515, 194 N.Y.S. 582? Gillet v. Bank of America, 160 N.Y. 549,
55 N.E. 292; Schneider v. Victor, 208 App. Div. 624, 203 N.Y.S.
897.)
Quoting from Gillet v. Bank of America, supra, the Court
said:
"If there is any uncertainty or ambiguity as to
the meaning of the agreement, it should be resolved
in favor of the Plaintiff, as it was the Defendant
who prepared this contract. If there is any doubt
as to the meaning of the terms employed, the Defendant is responsible for it, as the language is
wholly its own."
Thus, in Powerine, supra, this Court required that the
acts of the parties be deemed to be reasonable and honest and
that the parties act in good faith with each other pursuant to
a guaranty, and the Court indicated that in determining the intent of the parties that reasonable and honest intentions be
assumed.

This would require Plaintiff to use the first in-first

out accounting principles required by the language of the
Continuing Security Agreement executed between Plaintiff and Lee
(Exhibit P-9) which states:
"In accordance with customary and accounting
practice, Bank shall credit to such promissory
notes or enter in Debtor's Loan Account all payments made by the Debtor on account in indebtedness evidenced by such promissory notes on Loan
Account, all proceeds of collateral which are
finally paid to Bank at its own office in cash
or solvent credits, and other appropriate debits
and credits." (Paragraph 4)
Additionally, the Plaintiff specifically included in
Paragraph (4) of the Continuing Guaranty (Exhibit P-ll) that:
"Guarantors authorize Bank, without notice or demand and without affecting their liability hereunder
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from time to time to (a) renew, extend, accelerate or otherwise change the time for payment of, or otherwise change the terms of the
indebtedness or any part thereof, including
increase or decrease of the rate of interest
thereon; (b) take and hold security for the
payment of this Guaranty or the indebtedness
guaranteed, and exchange, enforce, waive and
release any such security; (c) apply such security and direct the order or manner of sale
thereof as Bank in its discretion may determine; and (d) release or substitute any one or
more of the endorsers of guarantors. Bank may
without notice assign the Guaranty in whole or
in part. (Emphasis added)
It should again be noted that these two instruments
were executed by Lee and the Defendant contemporaneously.

When

considered in light of these circumstances, the Plaintiff failed
to make any good faith effort to apply funds received by virtue
of the Continuing Security Agreement to the debt guaranteed by
the Defendant regardless of the specific language of its
Continuing Guaranty authorizing it to do so.
After notice of the withdrawal of the continuing guaranty, Plaintiff was, in good faith, required to apply the
payments made by Lee to its outstanding debt.

Plaintiff made

the decisions that Lee Chair Corporation would be better able to
pay off the $60,000.00 note if they continued to extend credit
on the accounts receivable line.

Plaintiff should not be

allowed to take such a course of action based on its business
decision and at the same time hold Defendant to a guaranty which
was cancelled as to future transactions as of July 6, 1971.
After said notice, Plaintiff had a duty to Defendant to apply
all receipts to payment of Leefs debts which were guaranteed by
the Defendant.
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POINT V
IF THE COURT TREATS THE LEE OBLIGATIONS AS SEPARATE
DEBTS, THEN THE DEFENDANT WOULD STILL BE ABSOLVED OF LIABILITY
THEREON.
In considering the promissory note (Exhibit P-2) 'it
should be noted that this Court has held that whether or not a
new note is given in payment of the original note, or simply as
an extension of the earlier debt is "a question to be determined
by ascertaining the intention of the parties as manifested by
the facts and circumstances attending their transactions."
(Gray v. Kappos, 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d 613, 1936, and Interstate
Trust Co. v. Headlund, 51 Utah 543, 171 P. 515, 1918.)

In the

instant case, Lee and Plaintiff in executing the new note for
a sum less than the original $60,000.00 debt and Plaintiff by
surrendering the original note, evidenced an intent that the
new note was in payment of the old debt, and, since the execution of the new note was subsequent to Defendant's letter cancelling the Continuing Guaranty, Defendant is not liable on that
note.
In Merchants National Bank v. Cressey, 164 Iowa 721,
146 N.W. 761 (1914), where a guaranty was an issue which covered
loans and advances, including renewals without notice and provided for termination of thirty days written notice, much the
same as the guaranty in the instant case, it was held:
"The guarantor was not liable on the renewal of
the note executed before the notice was given,
when the renewal was made more than thirty days
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after the revocation, . .It cannot be said that
this in any way lessened the right of the bank
in its enforcement of the obligation against him,
for with notice of his withdrawal it could yet
rely upon the existing evidence of the indebtedness made before such notice. In accepting the
renewal after such notice, it thereby elected
to be bound by his notice of withdrawal, and is .
presumed to have relied upon the security existing at the time of the renewal: (100 A.L.R.
1237.)
In Re; Kelly (1913) 73 Mich. 492, 139 N.W. 250,
Annotated Cases (1914) 848, the Court held that:
"Renewals of 90-day notes after revocation of
guaranty even in the form of a demand note are
not covered by the guaranty, even if the demand note be regarded as a continuing security
for a succession of notes to the payee." (100
A.L.R. 1237)
On February 4, 1972, Plaintiff and Lee executed a renewal note for the sum of $59,000.00. This created a new obligation not enforceable until May 4, 1972.

In so acting to create

a new obligation after notice and receipt of Defendant's letter
of cancellation, Plaintiff relieved Defendant of its obligation
under the continuing guaranty to guaranntee the debts
this case, the original note was surrendered upon execution of
the new note.

In 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, Section 918,

it states:
"The surrender of the original note upon receiving a renewal has been held to indicate
that the renewal note was accepted as payment
or novation with intent to discharge the original. . . . "
In the annotation titled "Renewal Note as Discharging
Original Obligation or Indebtedness," 52 A.L.R. 1416, it states
that:
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"It has been held in several jurisdictions
that the delivery back of the original note is
presumptive evidence that the renewal note is
accepted as payment."
With regard to the accounts receivable line of credit,
counsel refers the Court to the arguments contained in Point III.
The arguments contained therein clearly absolve the Defendant of
liability on the account receivable line of credit.
POINT VI
IF THE COURT HOLDS THAT THE SECOND CONTINUING GUARANTY
DID NOT SUPERSEDE THE FIRST CONTINUING GUARANTY AND THAT THE
DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR THE DEBT EVIDENCED BY THE PROMISSORY
NOTE, THEN THE DEFENDANT WOULD STILL BE ABSOLVED OF LIABILITY ON
THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE LINE OF CREDIT.
The Defendant cancelled the Continuing Guaranty
Agreement of December 17, 1970 (Exhibit P-ll) by its letter of
July 6, 1971 (Exhibit P-6).

There is no competent evidence

that there was any intent by the Defendant to do otherwise.
Pursuant to the terms of the Continuing Guaranty Agreement
(Exhibit P-ll) the liability of the Defendant would not be extended to future transactions after receipt of notice of cancellation.
After receipt of this cancellation, the Plaintiff proceeded to extend additional credit to Lees as well as receive
substantial amounts of funds which were credited to Lee's
accounts receivable credit line (Exhibit P-10).
The arguments contained in Point III clearly demonstrate
to the Court that the amount finally left outstanding on the
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accounts receivable line of credit was a sum which resulted
from advances of credit after notice of cancellation of the
Continuing Guaranty.

By its terms, said Continuing Guaranty ab-

solved the Defendant from liability for this indebtedness of
Lees.
Therefore, the judgment of the lower Court against the
Defendant should be reversed as it relates to the amounts outstanding on the accounts receivable line of credit to Lee's.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower Court against the Defendant
should be reversed and judgment entered for the Defendant dismissing Plaintiff's complaint no cause of action.
The lower Court's ruling that the Defendant did not
intend to cancel the Continuing Guaranty was not supported by a
competent evidence.

To the contrary, the evidence clearly

demonstrated that the Defendant's letter of July 6, 1971, was
a notice of cancellation pursuant to the terms of the Continuir
Guaranty.

Therefore, the subsequent transactions of credit

extensions to Lees were not covered by any Guaranty from the
Defendant.
Alternatively, the judgment of the lower Court shoulc
be reversed with regard to all damages in excess of the $59,00
principal on the promissory note dated February 4, 1972.
Respectfully submitted,
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